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Stephan
Dahl Chapter 3: Trends in cross-border and intercultural communication
At the end of the 20th century the world in general, and the developed world in particular is presenting itself in a new outlook. The Western model of liberal democratic societies has been victorious over authoritarian systems in Latin America and Europe. In our society we can see a change in political groups and activism: politics is no longer emphasizes itself as the binding and controlling mechanism of social cohesion and democratic legislation, but presents itself as the national regulator of the neoliberal world economy. The consciousness of many political and scientific elites is subdued to this neoliberal worldview, regarding the problems of social integration and democratic legitimization only in the terms of a cost-benefit-analysis and utility preferences.
By the way of 'globalization', as a result of the internationalization of commodity flows, migratory movements, pollution and information, the classical congruence of nation, state, and democracy is in a process of dissolution. The pressures of deregulation have forced states to give up protective barriers, and sovereign powers, on a large scale to provide the underlying economy with sufficiently large markets. More and more powers of the nation states are transferred to intergovernmental institutions, providing themselves with tools more powerful than those of the dissolving states, and it seems acting with a never increasing expansionism. The rise in the consciousness of sub-state-nations and stateless nations is equally a threat for the traditional order and reflects the political reorganization of the world.
In the advent of the neoliberal world-order, the subjective reality, and cultural integrity, of the individual has become under increasing attack by new means of international communication and information flow. The dominance of global players in the media is a phenomenon that can not be left untouched. The emergence of the global concepts of movies, shows and series, as well as the emergence of a global audience of a concentrated media ownership, with its impact on program contents, is a concept without precedence. Modern media content is characterized by a never ending stream of popular and mass culture oriented programming and has banned alternative views and discussions from the consciousness of the mass audience. While fighting for viewer ratings, the programming of most stations is dominated by economic interest factors rather than intellectual context. In the truest sense of the word, the culture has been comodified and is viewed as a cost-benefit factor for the attainment of the global media audience and the global information society. Politics has not been left untouched by this new global information society, and presents itself under the pressure of the popular, where context has often been sacrificed for media-representation and mass audience appeal. Global Business The changing business environment, the changes in communication technology, the political changes, encourage and facilitate the emergence of global business, transnational companies and the emergence of common markets around the world. Free Trade and Common Markets Free-trade agreements, such as NAFTA or more dynamic organizations such as the European Union, have given rise to enormous possible markets for a large amount of companies. The premise of 'globalization' is in fact the most important single concept emerging in today's market economies. With the emergence of a global economy, the export of business culture and business interests is evident. Today most bigger companies are run no longer in a 'national' way, but are strongly influenced by one management style or another; a massive export of Anglo-Saxon or Asian business culture, and their respective values. Foreign Direct Investment , TNCs, Oligopolization Foreign direct investment rose from $68 billion in 1960 to $2.1 trillion 1993, tripling between 1985 and 1993, showing a more rapid pace of globalization (UNCTAD,1994). The largest part of this investment was accounted for in the three major economic regions: US, Western Europe and Japan. While the numbers of transnational corporation rose from 7,000 to 37,000 from 1973 to 1993, with 206,000 overseas affiliates (UNCTAD, 1993), the structure equally changed from largely independent overseas subsidiaries and affiliates to integrated operations: in 1990 intra-firm trade accounted for around one third of world trade. While the number of TNCs has increased immensely, the markets also experience an enormous oligopolization, as competitors are going out of business or are merged into existing operations. Examples of this trend are numerous. Only two companies manufacture, for example, jet airplanes, and one company supplies 80% of the worlds computers with operating systems. In areas where there are still numerous players, the joint ventures, mergers and co-operation agreements have also been the dominant paradigm of the recent years: examples include the telecom co-operations like Global One and Unisource, and of course the recent merger of Chrysler-Daimler (and Nissan's commercial vehicle unit). Capitalism and Western Culture Export Morley and Robins explore critically the concepts of the globalization in the light of cultural change: "Historical capitalism has , of course, always strained to become a world system. The perpetual quest to maximize accumulation has always compelled geographic expansion in search of new markets, raw materials, sources of cheap labor and so on. The histories of trade and migration, of missionary and military conquest, of imperialism and neo-imperialism, mark the various strategies and stages that have, by the late twentieth century, made capitalism a truly global force. If this process has brought about the organization of production and the control of markets on a world scale, it has also, of course, had profound political and cultural consequences. For all that it has projected itself as transhistorical and transnational, as the transcendent and universalizing force of modernization and modernity, global capitalism has in reality been about Westernization - the export of Western commodities, values, priorities, ways of life. In a process of unequal cultural encounter, 'foreign' populations have been compelled to be the subjects and subalterns of Western empire, while, no less significantly, the West has come to face with the 'alien' and exotic culture of its 'Other'. Globalization, as it dissolves the barriers of distance, makes the encounter of colonial center and colonized periphery immediate and intense" (1995:108).
Political and socio-economical changes From colonial power to neoliberal Europe The current century has seen a magnitude of rise and fall of political power and economical, political, social and structural changes, which without doubt have influenced any society's culture that was touched. From the imperial ages early this century, Europe in particular has seen the decline of the colonial power, the democratization and communization, the rise and fall of totalitarian, nationalistic and socialist regimes, and their decline. Europe has also experienced the fall from economic and political superpower, in a century that was for a long time been best characterized as the USSR-USA century. Equally Asia has been struck by fundamental changes: from the imperial China to the communist China, the rise of the Tiger Economies, the Vietnam war, the Korean war, the independence of India, the Iran Iraq war, the Gulf war,... to name just a few. This summary of some main political, economical and structural changes can only highlight some of the movements that have taken place in the recent past. It can not, and does not attempt to be a fully fledged analysis of current political trends, but merely a overview of some changes that have influenced national culture in Europe and beyond. For the Western part of Europe, the end of WW2 marked the era of a new beginning. With fall of the Third Reich and the Mussolini state came the separation of Europe into East and West, into democracy and communism, a major driving force for the recent history, and cultural changes. European Integration After the wars of 1870, 1914 and 1939, for the first time the European continent embarked onto a mission to calm the national tension between France and Germany. Monet, Schumann, Adenauer and de Gasperi provided the new framework for the vision of a politically and economically united Europe, and the 'rapprochement' of the former powers Germany and France. Driven by Adenauer and de Gaulle, after his return to power in 1958, the EEC, merged in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome, was a major driving force in Europe, and provided, at least for some, the viable alternative to regain the power lost to the USA and the Soviets after WW2. Other, similar organizations, such as the Council of Europe and to a lesser extend the Brussels Pact of 1948 attempted a less fixed program of integration, and creation of a common market. NATO, established in 1949, on the other side, was a clear organization born out of the division of the world into the two major influence zones, and provided a mechanism of military defense of those states with a neoliberal worldview towards the threat of those operating under the socialistic paradigm. EFTA on the other hand provided Europe with the alternative version of a unified market, but political autonomy. The quest to establish a common European market, the extension of the neoliberal world order, was the driving force in the European integration that has been a major force in the past 50 years or so. Revolt and Social Change: May 1968 After W.W.II, Western Europe became the 'anti-Communist bastion', and moved to the center of the cold war, while at the same time trying to cope with its recent past. In Germany in particular this lead to enormous potential unrest, fueled by the introduction of the 'Emergency Situation Laws' (Notstandsgesetze) and the Spiegel-Scandal. Coupled with a formerly unknown witch-hunt for alleged communist activities and the rise of neo-fascism in Germany of the 60s, the student movement got heavily politicized. Other reasons for the unrest potential included the Vietnam War, particularly in the US and in recently war torn Europe. The killing of Martin Luther King, followed by the killing of 46, 2,100 wounded and some 21,000 arrests in the US caused further outrage in the US and in other countries whose political regimes were close to that. The writings of Herbert Marcuse and the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School were the most widely acknowledged base of the student movements in Europe. Particularly the notion, by Marcuse, that the working classes have lost their revolutional potential, and it could only be the students, intellectuals and social outsiders who could evoke a revolution, was a major influence factor for the students movements in Germany and France. The criticism of the political activism by the press lead to further rise of the Frankfurt School's Critical Theory and the Dialectics of Enlightenment. While however those works were highly analytical and critical of the commercialization and commodification of the news and media in general, they fell short of providing a reasonable alternative vision to the student movement. This missing vision was soon to be replaced by the works of Mao, Marx and Che Guevara, calling for an active revolution. The student revolt reached its high points during April and May 1968: Particularly in France, where the students gained the support of the workers, and some 10 million people went on strike, calling for political reforms. The government of de Gaulle had to make far reaching compromises and abandon the further liberalization of the French economy as a result of the unrest. In Germany, where the students did not seek the support of the workers, and hence the protests remained mainly confined to student-police fights, the new government of 1969, a social-democrat-liberal coalition, introduced many ideas of the student revolt into their programs, and issued a far reaching amnesty for the prisoners kept after the revolts. The reform of the German educational system for example, the reformed second cycle of the grammar schools and the comprehensive schools are direct results of the 68 movement. Equally, the emerging of the Green party can be widely attributed to the students of 68. On a more universal level, the feminist movement , the abortion discussion and liberalization, sexual liberalization as well as the peace movement have found a vital support in the 68 movement and much progress can be attributed to the 68 movement in Europe and the Flower-Power movement in the US. However, the movement fell short to convince the politics for the need of any economic reforms, with the exception of France, where however the economic reforms were less than hardly visible. Extension of power: the fall of Franco The quest for democratization, and with it the extension of the neoliberal market economy, particularly in western Europe, took its next step when the last remaining totalitarian regime ended with the death of Franco in 1975, and the democratization of Spain resulting in the general election of 1977 and the constitution of 1978. With the return of such symbolic figures as Josep Tarradellas, Dolores Ibarruri and Felipe Gonzalez Spain's path to democracy and her becoming part of what has often been called Churchill's vision of the 'House of Europe' seemed secured. With the failed putsch attempt in 1981, the golpe, the rule of the military in Spain finally came to an end. With Spain's entry into NATO in 1982, the symbolically strong opening of the Gibraltar boarder in 1985, and the membership in European Community in 1986 Spain joined the democratic states of the West, and the common market. Extending the neoliberal world view to the East The next major step in the history of Europe was the fall of communism, and with it the division of Europe. With the Soviet president Mikahail Gorbachev the policies of glasnost, perestroika and uskoreniye rose. In the light of the new policy, Hungary passed its draft law on independent public associations in 1988, a major step towards ending communist party rule. With the first free election in Poland in June 1989 and the collapse of the regimes of the GDR, the most symbolic of all collapses with the fall of the Berlin Wall, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania in November and December the division of Europe started came to an end. In March 1990 Lithuania was the first of fifteen Soviet republics to declare independence, and the shedding of Article 6 of the Soviet constitution; ending the Party's leading role. In April Hungary saw its first democratic elections since 1947, with the conservative Magyar Democratic Forum forming the first democratically elected government, and, in a later election, the first democratic president, the Free Democrat Göncz Árpád . 1991 started with the ill-fated attempt to crush nationalist secession among the Soviet republics, particularly in Vilnius and Riga. The equally ill-fated coup in August in Moscow ended with the rise of Boris Yeltsin to become the dominant figure in Russia, and finally the Soviet Union got officially dissolved on New Years Eve. The later confrontations, the siege of the White House and Ostankino Television Tower, in October 1993, also ended with Yeltsin remaining in power. Eastern Europe today is still in a transition to a full neoliberal order, but the necessary infrastructure has been build up. Extensive support from the Western nations for the changes towards market economy, and heavy investment have been streaming in ever since. The media landscape has been revolutionized, with commercial channels broadcasting in all countries of the former East, offering the same diet of programs as everywhere else in the West. Yugoslavia Europe's most bloody recent transition must be the fall of Yugoslavia. After the death of Communist leader Tito in 1980, both Croatian and Serbian nationalism fueled immensely. Under the leadership of Slobodan Milosovic Serbian nationalism gained momentum in 1988/9, and resulted in the walkout of the Slovenian and Croatian delegations during the 14th Special Congress of the League of Communists in January 1990. The victory of HDZ, the Croatian Democratic Union, under the leadership of the right-winger Franjo Tudjman in April 1990, lead to further tension. With Slovenia and Croatia breaking away from Yugoslavia, and rising tension and breakaway movements in ethnic mixed regions such as Krajina, Kosovo, Sandzzak etc. Once again, concentration camps, massacre, rape and terror returned to Europe. In the words of Branka Magras: " the year 1992, scheduled to be a milestone on the road to European unity, has seen Sarajevo and other Bosnian cities slowly bombarded to pieces and their inhabitants starved before the television eyes of the world" (1992). The support for the extreme right in Croatia, by the Western governments, has given rise to far spread criticism of the interest of extending markets rather than looking for the 'guilty ones' and fostering true democracy. New Democrats, New Labor and Neue Mitte Together with the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe came another political phenomenon: the virtual collapse of the traditional left in political culture. In the US, the UK and in Germany, the traditionally left parties have left the vision of social democracy and committed themselves to largely neoliberal targets; the links to trade unions have largely been stopped, the Calvinist ethic of the 'responsibility of the individual' rather than the collective responsibility has been introduced, deregulation and liberalization of markets has become priority, together with those elements that help the economical progress: tax cuts and restructuring of the welfare state. Nowhere else has the swing of the left to a promoter of neoliberal politics been more evident than in the UK: the conservative Tories have been left without any vision and program, trying to respond to what used to be their political field, and is now Labor's domain: the economy. Since 1997 it is Blair's 'Deal with the City' (and Clinton's 'Alliance with Wall Street') that promote a completely new vision of the social democrats: the market economy. The social-democratic visions of Roosevelt and Johnson, the 'Great Society', have been abandoned by US Democrats, and the slogan 'Leistung muss sich wieder lohnen' (performance must be rewarded again), in 1989 used by the conservative CDU in Germany is now guiding principle of the SPD (social-democrats) party program for the 1998 elections. Western politics and commercial influence The question, what are the intentions of Western politics is one with probably as may viewpoints as participants in the debate. The interconnection of economy and politics can however not be underestimated. Western politics still sees itself as a regulator of the capitalist economy in its states, however, it is equally involved in opening up opportunities and markets for the national economies, sometimes at the expense of democracy, but always under the guise of it. Those that comply with the opening of markets have been given lavish support, although they did not play by all the rules of Western democracy: Carlos Salinas in Mexico, Carlos Menem in Argentina and Boris Yeltsin in Russia are examples of this. Even dictatorships have been supported for 'creating a favorite climate of investment': Pinochet in Chile, Marcos in the Philippines and Suharto in Indonesia. Others, refusing to comply with the neoliberal order had to endure boycotts and even military intervention: Cuba and Nicaragua. The quick intervention of the US in the Gulf is one of the most widely discussed cases in the scenario of the Western states as protectors of economic interest, the destabilization of the Allende government in Chile by CIA actions another. Protectionism, in the forms of quotas and tariffs as well as subsidization of products shows other areas where the governments seem to at least largely defend industrial rather than consumer interests. The problematic situation, and the need for politics to bow down to economic pressure, and hence to more often neglect social and ecological issues is highlighted by Uwe Jean Heuse: "Einzelstaaten sind unfähig, ihr Sozialrechte und Umweltnormen gegen Globalunternemen durchzusetzen. Die vaterlandslosen Aktiengesellschaften finden immer einen Weg, nationale Bestimmungen auszuhebeln und einen Staat gegen den anderen auszuspielen" (The single states are unable to implement their social laws and ecological norms against [the pressure of] the global corporations. The homelandless PLCs always find a way to get around national directives, and to play with one state against the other). (1998:1). An even darker image about the power of politicians is painted by Herman and McChesney: "By 1996 Forbes magazine exulted in the fact that the world's governments, be they ostensibly left or right, could no longer 'interfere' with the prerogatives of business without suffering an economic punishment that would bring them down; governments have effectively lost their power to govern. Political debate and institutions therefore have largely become irrelevant" (1997:32). Conclusion The foregoing presentation of major political changes can efficiently be used to present major impact on cultures. The changes that have been presented have significantly changed the value orientation of societies: from Russia to Portugal, from Ireland to Greece. The fundamental impact a change in political and economic environment can have on the social structures and values of a society can at no stage be left unconsidered. Even a relatively 'short' event, like the Gulf war can show major shifts in the self-understanding of a society: Lloyd deMause (1990) describes that prior to the Gulf war "American national culture has been characterized by feelings of guilt, depression and sinfulness - partly linked to the 'Vietnam Syndrome'. " After the war ,"in George Bush's words, America could finally 'kick the Vietnam Syndrome'. What the war offered was the possibility of renewal and revitalization: America could rediscover its moral purpose and emotional wholeness ... This epic spectacle sustained a sense of national integrity and moral regeneration." A simple consideration of the force of the impact of the gulf war and the far more fundamental changes that have occurred in other parts of the world will be able to explain the need for political environment consideration when explaining shifts in culture. At the same time, politics as such have become less important: the political institutions have come under pressure from a more and more global industry, resulting in more dramatic changes towards a full scale, neoliberal world order. Media Trends Influence of the media on society Media can "serve to repress as well as to liberate, to unite as well as fragment society, both to promote and to hold back change" (McQuail, 1994: 64). This makes media an extremely powerful tool, a promoter of social, structural and cultural change, a role model for those that follow it. Mass media, television, cinema, magazines and newspapers are a power factor. McQuail summarizes their potential as: Attracting and directing public attention Persuasion in matters of opinion and belief Influencing behavior Structuring definitions of reality Conferring status and legitimacy Informing quickly and extensively (idem., 1994:64). Given the power potential of the mass media, the question of who's reality is presented; who owns the media and in whose interest, are the dominant questions in discussing the impact of media in the culture transformation of society. Decline of the public broadcasting in Europe During the 1980s Europe has seen a dramatic restructuring of its media landscape: the emergence of commercial television and a genuinely global commercial media market. This has brought about the relative decline of the former state, and often independent broadcasters. In the wave of general deregulation, the public broadcasters were diminished in importance, and became subject to the viewer ratings war in order to maintain their financial support. In reflecting the role of the public broadcasters, Herman and McChesney conclude: "If their [the public broadcasters] performance is poor, people will be ignorant, isolated, and depoliticized, demagoguery will thrive, and a small elite will easily capture and maintain control over decision-making on society's most important political matters" (1997:4). Equally Jürgen Habermas described that the public sphere works best, where it is free from society's political and economic pressures. This statement must alarm anyone, who is researching the impact of the decline of public broadcasting, and the influence of the current media landscape.
The emergence of commercial broadcasting Various literature focuses on the "global conglomerates" that control a large amount of the media to date. Herman and McChesney (1997) identify 6 global players: News Corporation, Time-Warner, Disney, TCI and Bertelsmann. Their interests in European media and other, dominant players is presented in annex 1.
Table 3 The five largest media conglomeratesCompanyCountryTurnover $bTime-WarnerUSA18.7Walt Disney / ABC Capital USA16.4BertelsmannGermany13.9ViacomUSA11.0News CorporationAustralia9.3 (Die Zeit, Edition 08.09.1995) Other than the main players world-wide, media ownership is also characterized by other corporations on a less large scale. However, the concentration in media ownership, and its interconnectedness to the economic powers can not be easily dismissed. The influence of each individual owner, and their clients, on the social reality transmitted via their respective media is of course the clue to the social reality as perceived by the viewers. This is not to say, that the viewer is a passive receiver and remains critique-less in front of the image of the world that is presented to him. But the way that information and images of reality is transmitted and displayed can have significant impact.
Table 4 Production PricesCountryProduction costBuy-in
price
Germany400.00060.000 Media contents presents itself today as a global form of entertainment. The concepts of game shows, talk shows, soaps and films are equally created around the world to mirror one type of society. What works in one country is exported heavily through a complex network of distribution and co-operation agreements as well as economic interests in stations in other countries than their homebase. 'Dallas', 'Dynasty', 'Roseanne', 'Ellen' and 'Married With Children', 'Nurses' and 'Golden Girls', 'X-Files', 'Startreck', 'the Simpsons', all are example of universally distributed programs on TV. Game shows like 'The Price is Right' and '5 versus 5' are produced around the world, and even Japanese concepts, long-time deemed as purely local entertainment, provide now a form of global entertainment in the form of the game show 'Endurance'.
Figure 1 Co-operation and Distribution Agreements of some media companies (1996)Co-operation and global distributionMost of the first and second tier media firms have distribution and co-operation agreements with the other players. For example: Disney has co-operation agreements with Bertelsmann, NBC and TCI, Kirch, CLT Ufa, Canal Plus and TF1. Some even have joint channels: such as Viacom and Time-Warner with the "Comedy Channel". For a more in-depth discussion of this phenomenon, the reader is referred to Herman & McChesney's book "Global Media" which analyses the global distribution and ownership in depth. In another interesting look at the European (or active in Europe) media moguls, Berlusconi, Kirch and Murdoch , Kleinsteuber points out that all of them have co-operation and distribution agreements. He discusses the influences, and in particular the differences of the "mogul" companies and the more capital based companies, like Viacom or Time-Warner. He traces, for example, that Berlusconi has joint-ventures with Kirch both in Germany, France and Italy, and co-production agreements with both Kirch and Murdoch (Kleinsteuber,1996, p.136f.). The influence of Bertolusconi's political ambitions on the content of his media certainly highlights the dangers of such a political-economical mix of mass influencing power.
Diversification into multimedia services Another trend is the diversification into multimedia services, jointly produced with telecommunications and information providers. Some of the alliances are detailed below. The quest for the 'dominance of the mind' reaches far beyond the current perspective that is detailed in this section. With the emergence of the multimedia conglomerates the message of the media conglomerates reaches even further beyond the current limits, and the globalization of content can be driven to new highs.
Figure 2 Media - Telecommunication and IT agreements (1996)
Cinema globalization The cinema industry, owned and operated by the most dominant media firms, also shows the signs of globalization, or as often claimed, Americanization. Meckel (1996, p.148) states that the market share of US-produced films shown in cinemas across the EU grew from 56% in 1985 to 76% in 1995. As Frank Webster (1995) remarks: in 1991 "Dances with Wolves, Terminator 2, Robin Hood Prince of Thieves and Silence of the Lambs were box office leaders in Germany, Britain, Italy, France, Spain, Australia and the USA - pretty well everywhere that there were cinemas". The co-operation and distribution agreements, the ownership of TV studios, cinemas and TV stations, video distribution, print media and radio and the multimedia services makes economic sense for the distribution of the world vision of these conglomerates. The circle of promoting and using the produced material to the full extend is closed by the shared ownership. Furthermore, the local, small size cinemas have experienced an enormous decline. Where the multiplex, fully commercialized cinemas have moved in, the independent cinemas have moved out, reducing the cinema menu to mass culture production (see Meckel, 1996).
Localization of focus At the same time however there seems to be a trend to localize media, media focus and media content, particularly in Europe. This new market is of course opened by the wider availability of media, however is quite strongly progressing. Examples of this localized or regionalized focus can be found in various countries: In Spain for example TV3 and Ch33 of the Generalitat de Catalunya provide localized content and news with great success. In the UK, BSkyB, the satellite media group, launched Sky Scottish, providing news and features for Scotland. In Germany, various TV stations in Munich, Hamburg and Berlin provide highly localized general programming TV. In Belgium and the Netherlands, the local stations provide daily local information, while the Amsterdam station has evolved to a full TV program. Although most of these stations provide the viewer with a link to his/her immediate surroundings, offering localized news and information, most of them also carry a large amount of "American-style", popular culture programming, such as films, talk shows and game shows. This type of program falls in line with the general programming that is offered through the globalized media firms, who in fact sometimes own and always distribute through these local channels. Equally, these channels represent the emergence, and out-sourcing of the local or regional advertising markets, and are often hence subject to the same programming constraints as their national and international counterparts. Morley and Robins (1995) conclude on the topic that "this new regionalism puts value on the diversity and difference of identities in Europe, and seeks to sustain and conserve the variety of cultural heritage, regional and national." (idem. 1995: 17) This celebration of the emergence of this type of media focus as the herald of the emergence of a local community appears to be a somewhat early bunch of flowers, for what really can be seen as just another part in the chain in the recuperating of production cost and the focus to provide the economy with a platform for their advertising.
In a deep ranging discussion regarding the two-way move of media, Matthias Kurp states: " As a reaction to the globalization of all communication processes and the emergence of a 'World culture', more and more counteracting forces develop with a local or regional focus. The maxim "Think global, act local" dominates therewith the paradox of simultaneous globalization and fragmentation." (Kurp, 1996, p.213) Figure 3 Americanization of TV: Volume of US programming on TV imports (1983)Resistance towards globalizationEqually, there seems to be a resistance to the "Americanization" of TV culture emerging in more and more European countries. While the EU commission is fostering protectionism in trying to enforce EU produced programs, the swing towards locally produced programs has been more radical in some countries than enforced by the EU. The German media situation can be seen as quite examplatory of this trend. While in the beginning of commercial stations virtually all prime time programming was American, by now most programming is produced in Germany itself (this overview is relating to the dominant commercial broadcasters RTL, SAT1 and Pro7 who can afford to produce locally): The average of American produced programming is some 33% in prime-time. In the UK, BSkyB announced only recently, that it would switch to more UK produced programming in order to revive subscriptions to the service. At present, this resulted in one series and some documentaries being produced in the UK, but further own-productions are planned. This trend also seems to be echoed in the Netherlands and Belgium, where VTM (Vlaamse Televisie Maatschapij / Flemish Television) has gone over to produce some 40% of its prime time programming in Flanders. Equally, RTL4 and RTL5 have stepped up own production activities. It can however not be said that for any TV station producing its own programming comes cheap. This can well be explanatory why, overall, only some 30% are own produced programming, 5% Co-productions and 38% bought in (Meckel, 1996, p.145).
Global content, produced locally The BSkyB announcement may be taken as explanatory for the trend in this apparent resistance against Americanization. As a profoundly commercial operator, and exempt from the EU content directive, BSkyB is making the move not in an attempt to reflect more the diversity of national, or supranational UK culture, but in an economically based intention. Herman and McChesney characterize BSkyB's programming policy as: "offering popular fare and audience-attracting special events, while neglecting anything profound, challenging and merely contributing to the public sphere"(1997;168). While the UK audience is served the story of a UK football team (in BSkyB's new series 'Dreamteam'), the series is produced around problems and with a plot that can be found in any US series, the only change is the surrounding. Equally, series produced by the RTL-brand of channels reflect no local values whatsoever, nor do they in any way reflect any notion of national identity other than the place where they take place. In 'Gute Zeiten, schlechte Zeiten' or the Dutch counterpart 'Goede tijden, slechte tijden' the problems encounter are to a large extend the same as can be found in any comparable family soap that has made its way around the globe. Any notion of political or social debate are barred from the content; current problems in the countries remain unreflected in the lives of the soap opera stars.
Conclusion Television, on which this debate has focused the most, is certainly not the only media with significant impact on its audience. It is however the most powerful of all tools, and the most widely spread. In 1996, Carmen Luke reported, that some 99% of all households own a TV set in Australia, 60% own two or more, and 72% own a VCR (1996). Economic pressure has lead the governments to deregulate the media situation in many countries of Europe, where previously the commercial media was relatively restricted, and in the case of most countries, the public broadcasters provided an unpreassured platform for program content, and a platform for a 'national identity'. The point to make here, is the fact that the commercial media has been, out of necessity for its own economic survival, the driving force behind the depolitization and banalization of the public sphere. "The stronger the positions of the culture industry become, the summarily it can deal with consumers' needs, producing them, and even withdrawing amusement" (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1944). It gives "full play to audience-attracting programs featuring sex and violence, all in accord with the market logic" (Herman & McChesney, 1997:188). The media hence contributes to the emergence of the 'global culture': Tom Cruise, Pamela Anderson, Brat Pit and so forth are role models for millions of people, their behavior is mirrored, digested and internalized. The norms and values, the morals of the culture industry, they represent are taken over. If they drink coke, the followers do.
The Internet
The Internet merits a different section of discussion. Primarily, because it is a quintessential different form of experiencing than television or cinema. While both TV and cinema, even with the large amounts of channels provided by now, are a passive form of communication, the Internet makes the communication activity active. The viewer actively chooses what s/he is prepared to see, and with whom to interact. While the media is essentially a one way communication process, where the feedback is only very marginally provided (by means of viewer ratings), the Internet offers the possibility of a far more interactive experience, with a feedback directly provided (this is particularly important in activities such as interactive games and chatting, while less in the WWW). The Internet also offers the possibility to jump boarders and cultures "at a single mouse click", and offers an unlimited resource for information of any kind and flavor. At the same time, the Internet breaks down the barriers between the more traditional entertainment services (TV, cinema, magazines etc.) as providers of content, the software firms, as providers of access software, and the communication sector (telephone), as providers of the links. The Emergence of the Net The Internet emerged in the 1960s as a US Department of Defense project. Linking with academic institutions during the 1980s, it emerged as a public, global computer network at the beginning of the 1990s, reaching widespread distribution also into non-academic or defense related homes. The spectacular growth of the Internet can be seen at the hostcounts presented below both for Europe and world-wide.
Table 5 Hostcount developmentDateEuropean Hostcount1World-wide HostcountJanuary 19985,942,49129,670,000January 19973,921,94616,146,000January 19962,284,7509,472,000January 19951,106,0774,852,000January 1994587,1352,217,000January 1993303,8281,313,000Source: Network Wizards (www.nw.com) and RIPE (www.ripe.net)Also the following abstract of the Dutch Volkskrant shows the uptake of the Internet: "Van de ondervraagde bedrijven met meer dan honderd werknemers zegt 58 procent over een Internet-aansluiting te beschikken. In Januari was dit nog 35 procent.(...) Binnen een jaar komt daar volgens de huidige gegevens nog 20 procent bij" (Of the asked companies with more than 100 employees, 58% says to have an Internet connection. In January, this was 35%. Within a year the current figures will grow by 20%.) (De Volkskrant, in van Ruler, Groendijk et al, 1996:95). Internet Users and Usage The total amount of Internet users remains of course still unknown. Hammond (1996) estimates the amount of users at around 50 million in 1996, 100 million in 1997 and 400 million by the year 2000. With the emergence of alternative connection methods to the telephone access, this number might however be well surpassed by then. In January 1997, the distribution of Internet access in households is shown in the table below.
Table 6 Internet access in 1997Country% Japan18.4 USA16 Germany11.7 Hong-Kong11.7 Taiwan10.3 UK9.5 Australia8.9 Singapore7 France6.5 South Korea6.3 Italy5.8 Source: IDC/Link in Hammond 1996 p.290 The main uses of the Internet have been documented by a Nielsen Research in 1995. The persons 16+ in the US and Canada using the Internet in the past 24 hours (over 24 hours ago) who used to... Table 7 Internet usage <24hrs >24hrsAccess WWW 72% 44%Send E-mail 65% 48%Download Software 31% 19%Participate in an interactive discussion 21% 21%Participate in a non-interactive discussion 36% 43%Use another computer 31% 21% Utilize real-time audio or video 19% 17% (Source: Hammond, 1996:275) Critical Mass Levels The critical mass conceptual framework helps "to better understand the size of the audience needed for a new technology to be considered successful" ( Morris & Organ, 1996: 6). Morris & Organ conclude: "Each of the[se] specific Internet services can be viewed as we do specific television stations, small town newspapers, or special interest magazines. None of these may reach a strictly mass audience, but in conjunction with all the other stations, newspapers, and magazines distributed in the country, they constitute mass media categories. So the Internet itself would be considered the mass medium, while the individual sites and services are the components of which this medium is comprised" ( Morris & Organ, 1996: 6). They also quote Valente (1995) who "notes that the critical mass is achieved when about 10 to 20 percent of the population have adopted the innovation" ( Morris & Organ, 1996: 6). This would indeed suggest, that the Internet has reached critical mass in the US, Japan, Germany , Hong-Kong and Taiwan. It also suggests that it is close to have achieved that status in the UK and Australia. With the growing boom of the Internet, it may well have achieved this status by now. Following the notion of the erosion of the boundaries between true mass communication and interpersonal communication, Neuman (1991) notes: " The quintessential characteristic of the new electronic media is that they all connect with one another. We are witnessing the evolution of a universal, interconnected network of audio, video and electronic text communication that will blur the distinction between interpersonal and mass communication and between public and private communications... The ultimate result... will be intellectual pluralism and personalized control over communication." ( Neuman, 1991 in: McQuail, 1994: 88)
The Commercialization of Cyberspace While the Internet in the beginning was a distinctive academical network, and frowned upon any commercialization, the growth, and potential for commercial growth, has resulted in the effective commercialization and commodification of Cyberspace. US government support for the backbones of the net has been withdrawn in 1995 and been handed over to seven firms, including the telecom giants MCI and Sprint. As Bart Ziegler notes: "an already compromised ban on commercial use of the Internet ended altogether" (1995). The battle of Microsoft and Netscape for the dominance in Internet access software is just one of the examples of the commercialization of every aspect of the Net: Cello and Mosaic, the predecessors of the browser software were free software, developed and distributed by academic institutions such as the Swiss CERN. While it is true that everyone can create a Website with little investment, attracting visitors to such a site is costly and time consuming. The traditional media firms have been heavily investing in branding and promoting their sites through their other operations, resulting in an enormous popularity of sites connected to the traditional media. Herman and McChesney observe: "The relevant media analogy for the Internet, then, is not that of broadcasting with its limited number of channels, but, rather, that of magazine publishing or book publishing. Assuming no explicit state censorship, anyone can produce a publication, but the right to do so means little without distribution, resources and publicity" (1997:125). The emergence of the 'push' technology is equally a sign of the dominance of certain media and software firms aiming to broadcast their commercial content: News Corporation, the Microsoft/NBC venture MSNBC and CNN all provide direct 'push' feeds of streaming video and audio and information. The advertising vision of a 'web in the web', dominated by a handful of highly profitable, commercial websites, has become clearer. In summary, we can say, that the Internet has experienced an enormous boom over the last decade from a small and rather closed network to a major influence factor, which has reached critical mass level in a number of countries. It has also been commercialized heavily, and traditional media companies have moved in to provide commercial on-line content. Axioms of the previous section The neoliberal worldview has been the major political model in the last years: it has been victorious over alternative political models. Global business has increased like never before: the emergence of TNCs and Free Trade areas is evidence of this. The rise of Western TNCs, and their pursue of markets, has lead to an enormous export of Western lifestyle and culture, contributing to the growth of a multinational hybrid culture. The traditional forces opposing the rise of a neoliberal worldorder have declined, alternative political models have, largely, ceased to exist . Western politics is promoting the extension of the neoliberal worldorder, and is increasingly under pressure of the global industry. The decline of public broadcasting and the emergence of commercial media has helped to shape a multinational hybrid culture. The global, commercial media is in a concentrated ownership of a few companies, linked to each other by distribution and co-operation agreements. The programming of most media has become non-political and non-critical, it displays the same content to a world-wide audience, either through globally shared programs, or locally produced programs with global content. The Internet facilitates the global communication enormously: it has reached critical mass levels in a number of the Western countries. The Internet is in the stage of developing into a commercial information medium, the analogy most likely towards the media environment is the publishing business. |
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